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In many ways law is colonialism’s fi rst language. The language of law, or 
more specifi cally, the performative aspects of legal discourse, provided 
the fi rst European explorers with a dramatic medium by which they 
might familiarize the unfamiliar, a way to locate themselves as governing 
subjects in what was, for them, a new found land. During those terror-
izing yet fascinating fi rst moments of the colonial arrival European law 
functioned for the European imagination as a socially sanctioned theat-
rical process. This was a ritual by which their imaginations might move 
to a position of authority over what they perceived to be, not transgres-
sive (at least not yet), but unintelligible. For those Europeans wandering 
in what they believed to be either terra nullius or (later) a land popu-
lated by barbarians, transplanted European law became the one singular 
method of both political order and psychological stability. Law from 
back home, as it were, became a method both of writing the new land 
into ordered existence and, later, of reading its inhabitants out of resis-
tance and into control. Consider, for example, Christopher Columbus’ 
“legalized” landfall in 1492.
Beginning with the most famous of beginnings (or endings, depend-
ing on your point of view), Stephen Greenblatt recalls Columbus’ cel-
ebrated account of his fi rst voyage. Possession of the “new” world oc-
curred, in the fi rst instance, as an action executed through a series of pre-
ordained gestures and speech-acts. Greenblatt cites Columbus’ unfurl-
ing of the royal standard; his reading of a proclamation, and his giving 
of new names to various islands—all performed in front of the fl eet’s 
offi cial recorder. Greenblatt also mentions a number of ritualistic ac-
tions performed by later explorers: the erection of crosses, fl ying of fl ags, 
saying of prayers, cutting of branches, throwing of sands, construction 
of houses or chapels, and, most important, the notarizing of documents 
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(56). Columbus’ papers were then “carefully sealed, preserved, carried 
back across thousands of leagues of ocean to offi cials who in turn coun-
tersign and process them according to the procedural rules; the nota-
rized documents are a token of the truth of the encounter and hence 
of the legality of the claim” (57). Perhaps most striking throughout the 
records is Columbus’s explicit insistence that no person “contradicted” 
him while reading his proclamations. As Greenblatt points out, what 
is important is that Columbus followed the legal rules of proclamatory 
procedure: “Why there was no objection is of no consequence; all that 
matters is that there was none” (59).
To Greenblatt, it is imperative that we recognize just how strange 
these processes were—not only in their bizarre political posturing, but 
also in their psychological necessity. These speech acts, acts fashioned 
over centuries of mediated contact with other cultures, here constituted 
for Columbus and the other early Europeans “the reassuring signs of 
administrative order” (54), what Greenblatt, quoting de Certeau, char-
acterizes as a “scriptural operation” (58). Faced with the absolute radi-
cal otherness of the American lands and peoples, Europeans “naturally” 
reached for the most familiar (and familiarizing) artifi cial procedures at 
hand: the written “script” of law. In Greenblatt’s words, Columbus’ dis-
play marks “the formality of the occasion and offi cially designates the 
sovereign on whose behalf his speech acts are performed; what we are 
witnessing is a legal ritual observed by men whose culture takes both 
ceremony and juridical formalities extremely seriously” (55).
Certainly the juridical process here functions as a familiarizing ritual 
(a series of verbal statements, theatrical performances, and writing activ-
ities) which somehow, not unlike magical rites in the face of The Great 
Plague, tries to render the unintelligible or the threatening both intel-
ligible and tame. The process reinscribes the conventional superiority of 
writing cultures over oral ones; these acts, moreover, are public and of-
fi cial: as a representative of the king and queen, as a distant lieutenant of 
their power, Columbus follows a set of pre-ordained gestures in order to 
legitimize his actions. And, as a legitimizing discourse the performative 
aspects of law are then used both to install the Spanish crown’s claim to 
sovereignty and to ensure Columbus’ own status. Most signifi cant in all 
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of these actions is a rationalization at the heart of Greenblatt’s discus-
sion: all of Columbus’ quasi-legal actions “are performed entirely for a 
world elsewhere” (56). Legal ritual here functions, not for the edifi cation 
or correction of the locals (they have not yet been encountered), but for 
the valorization of an imposing, alien culture. This statement is true not 
only in the sense that Europeans would later deem irrelevant (or, if not 
irrelevant, in need of adaptation) whatever the yet-undiscovered locals 
thought or felt; but this statement is also true, more crucially, in the 
sense that law here stretches time and space in order to sustain European 
epistemology. Conversely, European ways of knowing and thinking are 
themselves stretched to realize a chronology and a geography perceived 
as lawless and therefore essentially unreal. Let me elaborate.
In the fi rst instance Columbus’ legal actions seem to perform a simul-
taneous action of erasure and inscription. Stephen Slemon has astutely 
observed, 
If colonial discourse’s fi rst act of tropological fi guration is to 
constitute the site of the Other as discursively uninscribed, its 
second act is to fi ll that space. . . . For within the ‘totalizing 
global vision’ of the colonizing gaze, no territory can be left 
uncharted, no region can remain incognita or nameless or un-
claimed. . . . Within this process the guarantee of ‘knowledge—
the matrix upon which the Other is made subject within dis-
course—is not observation or empiricism, but rather, author-
ity.’ (qtd. in Brydon and Tiffi n 105)
As an authorizing force, the law, even in Columbus’ most attenuated, 
delegated, and performative form, seems to perform this double action 
of violent appropriation. Precisely this concept of a legalized authoritari-
an “violence” underlies Walter Benjamin’s famous 1928 essay on law, his 
“Critique of Violence,” as well as the superb essays contained herein by 
Christopher Bracken, Ravit Reichman, and Valerie Karno. Any kind of 
native symbolic system (including, most notably, that of law)—whether 
it be based on oral custom or hieroglyphic tablature—is erased by the 
legal inscriptions of the European arrivistes. Functioning as a kind of 
theatrical displacement or exorcism of European anxiety, the invoca-
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tion of European juridical forms always, already, and also places the 
yet-to-be-encountered Other within the discursive grids of Eurocentric 
authority. The othered subject exists, in effect, always and already as an 
object to be known, a transgression waiting to happen—or, in Isobel 
Findlay’s elegant argument, a “difference” about to be elided. Likewise, 
any potential symbolic systems of the other are emptied of meaning, or 
fi lled with negative meaning in need of rectifi cation, long before those 
symbolic systems are encountered, as a pre-condition of their impos-
sibility. 
From their earliest beginnings European literatures contain, not a sim-
plistic, but a tremendously ambivalent attitude toward the law. English 
writers, for example, from Chaucer and Langland onwards have persis-
tently and sardonically deployed legal imagery to explore shifting po-
litical, social, or moral themes. These explorations, predictably enough, 
cover the entire spectrum of interests of their various authors, and one 
can produce myriad examples for myriad positions. From Chaucer’s 
own sleazy Seargeant at Law, through Shakespeare’s trial of Shylock, to 
Dickens’ plaintive Mr. Bumble (“the law is a ass”), to Forster’s famous 
trial scenes in A Passage to India, even onto Agatha Christie’s sepia-tinted 
novels of suspense, intrigue and horrid murder, British writers have sys-
tematically deployed images of law (or, at the very least, of its corrupt 
practitioners) to expose political immorality and human folly. 
Yet interestingly this same law—warts and all—is also consistently 
foregrounded by English writers as the originary model for all legiti-
mate legal systems throughout the Empire. English law, whatever its 
shortcomings, marks for the Eurocentric imaginary the single point 
of origin, the beginning of legal civilization for everywhere that exists 
beyond British boundaries, particularly throughout the British Empire. 
Consider, for example, Edmund Spenser’s 1596 image of English and 
Irish legal systems in his A View of the State of Ireland, an image that falls 
squarely into the orientalized binarisms of Self and Other, Sameness 
and Difference, so well-known to present-day postcolonialists. For 
Spenser, British law is a system of regulations “ordained for the good of 
the common-weale,” a system bluntly contrasted to the “barbaric” “cer-
emonies and superstitious rites” of the indigenous Irish (4, 11). Renisa 
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Mawani makes similar powerful and convincing arguments about the 
North American Aboriginal.
My point here is that the ambivalent and at times contradictory lit-
erary representation of law is hardly the sole preserve of an oppressed 
postcolonial elite, a marginal activity practiced outside of, and against, 
Britain (or France or Spain or America). On the contrary, the ambiva-
lent literary imaging of law is, in the fi rst instance, a European legacy; 
but one that colonial and postcolonial writers continually subject to the 
most intricate forms of hybridization, adaptation, and deconstruction. 
As Jason Gottlieb superbly illustrates in his essay herein, the imaging 
of law becomes one way to interrogate postcolonial voices, subjective 
agency, and political urgency.
The representation of law, moreover, not surprisingly dominates both 
the historical and literary narratives of colonial settlement. As a social 
and moral cartography, British common law was traditionally under-
stood within British colonies to articulate the customary body of com-
munally held moral and social values. In addition to governing the social 
relations of subjects, it was used, obviously, to demarcate borders, estab-
lish property, and set out the limits of accepted and unacceptable behav-
iours. In North America one thinks immediately, perhaps, of The Royal 
Proclamation of October 7, 1763, in which King George generously 
gave “Power” to the Governors of Quebec, East Florida, West Florida, 
and Grenada, and politely invited them “to make, constitute, and ordain 
Laws, Statutes, and Ordinances for the Public Peace, Welfare, and good 
Government of our said Colonies . . . as near as may be agreeable to 
the Laws of England” (6). “As near as may be agreeable,” that is, the 
same but different. Law, in a fl ourish of common sense, here embodies 
not only distant British communal values (happily imported into North 
America), but also the entire epistemology of Western morality.
Written colonial law was no less poetical, and was also meant to be 
perceived and presented, ideally, as independent of the discourse that 
embodies it; ideally again, written law was to be experienced as the fi xa-
tion of natural regulations necessary to preserve and protect the health of 
an entire body politic. Colonial law emerges within and for colonial cul-
tures as the necessary forceful inscription of authoritarian desire, or what 
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Pierre Bourdieu so poetically calls “the entire [offi cial] activity of ‘world-
making’” (838). As Ronny Heaslop, E.M. Forster’s vapid Magistrate, 
remarks in A Passage to India, “We’re out here to do justice and keep the 
peace . . . I am out here to work, mind, to hold this wretched country by 
force . . . We’re not pleasant in India, and we don’t intend to be pleasant. 
We’ve something more important to do” (50).
Ronny’s unpleasant faith in Britain’s imperialist burden, however, un-
consciously implies its own fearful corollary. That is to say: the construc-
tion of a colonial legal system, and the worldmaking that it constitutes, 
is hardly an unresisted or uncomplicated political or psychological pro-
cess. The imposition of colonial law—from the fi rst symbolic actions 
during the fi rst colonial encounter, through to the actual bloodshed of 
armed settlement and deracination—is a violent process comprised pri-
marily of resisted force. But a force (and series of resistances) undreamt 
of in Ronny’s philanthropy. Colonial law, as Ravit Reichman shows in 
her wonderful argument, is a force remarkable, not only for the ease 
with which it could mystify the brutal massacre of indigenous peoples 
and cultures, but also for the uneasy smoothness with which it could 
(and continues) to mask both its own internal fi ssures and pressures 
and its external opponents who threaten continually to undermine its 
effectivity. 
The law, colonial or otherwise, in other words, is hardly a unifi ed, uni-
vocal phenomenon. It is, as Eric Cheyfi tz and Peter Fitzpatrick subtly 
interrogate in this issue, a site of desire, both authoritarian and resistant, 
a site where desire is actualized. Even as a discourse of control, needless 
to say its most dominant manifestation, law is always riven by internal 
divisions and external upheaval. The force of law, then, is remarkable 
principally for its multivalent violences, the virtual panoply of strate-
gies (both complementary and contradictory), with which it struggles 
to institute and replicate itself as the central discourse of offi cial power. 
Amongst these many strategies are an inherent theatricality, a hegemon-
ic realignment of indigenous systems of law, and a deployment of both 
physical and symbolic violence. These multiple aspects of the state ap-
paratus, these chameleon-like strategies of colonial law, are what form 
the nucleus of this very special issue of ARIEL. 
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As all of the essays in this special issue attest, the “Law and Literature” 
movement has come a long way since its inception within Anglo-
American literary and legal circles so many years ago. The movement 
itself has been a complex and multivalent interdisciplinary enterprise, 
one in which law is recognized, prima facie, as a specialized language or 
narrative, a series of performative acts governed, in turn, by a variety of 
rhetorical or literary tropes and regulations. James Boyd White, Stanley 
Fish, Sanford Levinson, Costas Douzinas, and Ronnie Warrington, to 
name but a few, have already shown us that the fi gure of law not only 
permeates our cultures of the past and present, but is itself a “literature” 
complete with its own rhetorical tropes, poetical paradoxes, and points 
of contested interpretation. As Canada’s Tina Loo so succinctly puts it, 
the discourse of law is characterized by “a particular language and a way 
of seeing and explaining the world. The ‘person’ is the law’s ‘object of at-
tention’: it defi nes what and who a person is or may be” (7).
It is a mistake to see the Anglo-American Law and Literature move-
ment, however, as a unifi ed group of academics working on a single 
topic. Certainly the principal part of the “movement” began with people 
like James Boyd White and soon after the likes of Fish, Posner, Weisberg, 
Graff, and Mailloux, a group made up, primarily, of legal and literary 
academics in America and critical legal theorists in England who began 
to explore the crossovers between literary theory and legal writing. Early 
critics of their efforts scoffed at the idea of literary scholars “practicing” 
bad law and good lawyers “doing” bad literary theory. Some legal theo-
rists also saw the movement as trivializing the processes, workings, and 
application of “real” law. 
But the movement itself, as the essays in this collection illustrate, de-
veloped into a number of diverse and intriguing areas, which include 
predictable topics such as censorship, and interpretations of American 
constitutional law; identity politics and law, the discourse of land 
claims, narrative and story. The movement, in other words, developed 
into a series of movements, ranging from the simplistic (identifying 
images of law in literature or fi lm; exploring the narrative techniques 
of summaries and/or addresses to the jury) to the extraordinarily com-
plex (for example, Greenblatt on Columbus’ legalistic rhetoric as a key 
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justifi cation of the colonizing project). Recently, attention has begun 
to be paid to the intersections of law and literature within a postcolo-
nial context and there have been notable achievements by all of our au-
thors, as well as such books as Eve Darian-Smith and Peter Fitzpatrick’s 
Laws of the Postcolonial and various articles in journals such as Mosaic 
and Studies in Law and Literature (most notably Joseph Pugliese’s fi ne 
study, “Rationalized Violence and Legal Colonialism: Nietzsche contra 
Nietzsche”).
A subtle and complex thread throughout the study of law and culture, 
moreover, has been the political psychoanalytical critics who approach 
the legal site as a place where narrative takes on a highly specialized 
meaning. As Walter Benjamin argued in the early twenties, the law in-
scribes and re-inscribes its own violent interests behind a facade of tran-
scendent univocal judgment so that the fi gure of law thus constitutes, 
in one sense, the perfect metonym of that colonial symbolic network 
which both installs subjects within an economy of hierarchical values 
and inexorably forms, in the minds of those subjected, an internalized 
epistemic reliance on the legitimacy of its own force. Uncannily prefi g-
uring Iraqi responses to American belligerence in contemporary Iraq, 
Frantz Fanon wrote in the early 1950s: 
In the colonies it is the policeman and the soldier who are the 
offi cial, instituted go-betweens, the spokesmen of the settler and 
his rule of oppression . . . by their immediate presence and their 
frequent and direct action [they] maintain contact with the 
native and advise him by means of rifl e-butts and napalm not 
to budge. It is obvious here that the agents of government speak 
the language of pure force. The intermediary does not lighten the 
oppression, nor seek to hide the domination; he shows them 
up and puts them into practice with the clear conscience of an 
upholder of the peace; yet he is the bringer of violence into the 
home and into the mind of the native. (29; my emphases)
Yet in its very ambivalence, what I will argue later is its implicit psy-
chic “splittedness,” the law also stands most importantly as a metonym 
of imperialism’s always and already threatening condition of implo-
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sion. Ironically, the ambivalent, internally confl ictual, and hybridized 
language of imperialist law also provides many postcolonialists with the 
state’s weakest link, its most fragile social ritual, one ripe for the revision-
ing. And revisioning, in an inescapable logic, never exists “outside” its 
own oppression; as an intrinsic aspect of the differential/deferential am-
bivalence that is the colonialist equation, “revisioning” is itself a mirrored 
series of constant re-arrangements, re-alignments, and re-negotiations. 
The notion that these various kinds of “narrative” and “interpreta-
tion” are key concepts in law (as well as in literature and fi lm) is a truism 
in the early Law-as-Literature movement. Early theorists and crit-
ics, represented especially in Sanford Levinson’s and Steven Mailloux’s 
Interpreting Law and Literature: A Hermeneutic Reader, concentrate on 
law as storytelling, a state-sponsored written narrative that enshrines 
the commonly held values of communities and is subject to interpreta-
tions by legal authorities. In a lucid and provocative essay, for example, 
Sanford Levinson invokes the image of the magistrate as a literary critic 
deployed by the State to interpret the “true meaning” of legal narratives. 
In an odd echo of both Pierre Bourdieu and Percy Bysshe Shelley, he 
depicts law and the legal enterprise respectively as a textual object and 
an interpretive process, as well as a kind of Ozymandian hieroglyphic: 
“Constitutions, of the written variety especially, are usefully viewed as a 
means of freezing time by controlling the future through the ‘hardness’ 
of language encoded in a monumental document, which is then left for 
later interpreters to decipher” (Levinson 156).
Levinson’s remark is important for a number of reasons: it highlights 
what he calls “the centrality of textuality to the lawyer’s enterprise” 
(156); it implicitly notes “the centrality to law of textual analysis” (157); 
it registers the early Law and Literature movement’s fascination with 
law as a social narrative, a story that can be best decoded with the tools 
provided by literary theory (most notably, deconstruction); and it sets in 
place a way of looking at law that continues to reverberate in analogous 
critical fi elds such as fi lm (a notable example is David A. Black’s descrip-
tion of fi lm and law as types of “narrative regimes” 34).
But Levinson’s enthusiastic handling of the literary legal text received 
both outright condemnation (for example, Owen Fiss’s infamous rebut-
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tal that Levinson was a nihilist, 166), as well as an extremely interesting 
qualifi cation. Two years following the initial publication of Levinson’s 
“Law as Literature,” Robin West, one of the movement’s important 
participants, made the following important critique in the fi ne essay, 
“Adjudication is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations about the Law-
as-Literature Movement:” 
The analogue of law to literature, . . . although fruitful, has 
carried legal theorists too far. Despite a superfi cial resemblance 
to literary interpretation, adjudication is not primarily an in-
terpretive act of either a subjective or objective nature; adju-
dication . . . is an imperative act. Adjudication is in form in-
terpretive, but in substance it is an exercise of power in a way, 
which truly interpretive acts, such as literary interpretation, are 
not. Adjudication has far more in common with legislation, 
executive orders, administrative decrees, and the whimsical 
commands of princes, kings and tyrants than it has with other 
things we do with words, such as create or interpret novels. 
Like the commands of kings and the dictates of a majoritarian 
legislature, adjudication is imperative. It is a command backed 
by state power. No matter how many similarities adjudication 
has with literary linguistic activities, this central attribute dis-
tinguishes it. If we lose sight of the difference between literary 
interpretation and adjudication, and if we do not see that the 
difference between them is the amount of power wielded by 
the judiciary as compared to the power wielded by the inter-
preter, then we have either misconceived the nature of interpre-
tation, or the nature of law, or both. (Qtd in Black 36)
West’s caveat is tremendously important because it opens up the fi eld 
to so many crucial further qualifi cations. On one hand the statement 
constitutes a healthy salvo against the pretensions of literary academics 
who over-value the modest political and social effects of their so-called 
“interventions.” Likewise, the analogy of law to a royal imperative nicely 
delineates the Foucauldian genealogy of modern law starting in the clas-
sical view that law is a scriptural embodiment of the king’s body and 
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hence of the king’s will (Foucault x). But there are also many begged 
questions that qualify, if not undermine, West’s insistence on the es-
sential differences between adjudication and interpretation, and these 
problems emanate, I think, from an understanding of four key concepts: 
power, subjectivity and its performative aspects, truth affects and the 
nature of literary interpretation.
For West, adjudication is an “imperative act” (an exercise of power 
backed by the state), and therefore something essentially different 
from, though similar in form to, “truly interpretive acts” of either a 
subjective or objective nature; different from the amount and nature of 
any “power wielded by the interpreter;” and, most importantly, differ-
ent from non-judicial “linguistic activities” which are implicitly power-
less in comparison to the formidable forces of state power. Now, West’s 
argument seems to depend on the premise that “power” is a tool pos-
sessed by some and not by others. The state possesses power; interpret-
ers do not. Or, at the very least, literary interpreters possess less power 
than the judiciary. Certainly a “real” judge who sentences a “real” de-
fendant to prison possesses more social power than a literary critic who 
protests against the sentence. This is clearly the case, for example, in the 
unjust sentencing of Donald Marshall or David Milgaard in Canada 
despite powerful counter-arguments testifying to their innocence, or 
most recently, the execution of Stanley “Tookie” Williams notwith-
standing large protests against (alternative interpretations of ) the death 
penalty in California.
West’s one crucial error, I think, lies precisely in this binaristic view of 
power and, consequently, the assumptions that (1) law is autonomous 
from other social discourses; (2) there is the possibility of “objective” 
interpretations, not to mention “truly” (as opposed to “falsely”) inter-
pretive acts; and (3) power is something tangible that can be possessed 
rather than something intangible that can be negotiated. This is clearly 
not the case, for example, in either the 1928 judicial decision that cat-
egorized D.H. Lawrence’s Lady Chatterley’s Lover as “pornographic” or 
the more recent “interpretation” and “adjudication” by the Ayatollah 
Khomeini of Salman Rushdie’s The Satanic Verses or the confl icting in-
terpretations of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed by a variety of in-
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terpreters both within and outside the Islamic world. In the former case 
literary “interpreters” made notable progress in negotiating the balance 
of power, and with the hindsight of the 21st century we can see who ulti-
mately possessed in this case and over a period of time more or less power 
concerning censorship and publication. In the cases of Khomeini’s in-
famous fatwah on Rushdie and the recent spate of violent protests over 
journalistic cartoons, we have cases where “literary” interpretation is not 
only an act of adjudication but also an act of theological speculation and 
judgment with real life and death consequences.
My point is that West’s argument operates within a conservative mod-
ernist fi eld where there is such a thing as “objective” truth; where a uni-
fi ed authentic essential subjectivity is a given; and where power is nar-
rowly defi ned as the ability to act in a particular way, or to make socially 
sanctioned (and sanctioning) decisions, which last into perpetuity. But 
power, as Foucault has shown us, is never merely an instrument in the 
pay of one historically specifi c group or individual; power, rather, is the 
force emanating from below, the energy that is everywhere and always 
being negotiated by a myriad number of participants.
As this entire special issue of ARIEL demonstrates again and again, 
it is a state illusion, an ideological construction that the law is any-
thing other than an historically specifi c construction built by a cultural-
ly specifi c group for application in a particular time and space. W. Lance 
Bennett and Martha S. Feldman elsewhere remark, “[The] achievement 
of justice is not so much dependent on the procedure, per se, as on the 
societal acceptance of the procedure and the coherence of societal beliefs 
with the procedure” (cited in Black 47). Or, as my fl imsy examples of 
Lawrence, Rushdie, and the cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed illus-
trate, power is something that is never static but always and already in 
a state of change. Add to this dynamic sense of power the fact that the 
public practice of law (as in the public trial) is primarily performative, 
although hardly the “showbiz” represented in the fl uffy fi lm Chicago, 
law is nonetheless a series of speech acts and choreographed movements 
performed by a variety of “actors,” very few of whom have any accurate 
perception of their social and political dispensability, all of whom have 
signifi cant self-serving interests. 
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West’s own image of royal prerogative, in other words, contradicts the 
main thrust of his argument. Foucault has clearly shown that, if the law 
embodies the monarch’s will, indeed, if the law is the scriptural written 
embodiment of the king’s (and in time, the state’s) body, then any law 
is by defi nition the embodiment of desire. As an embodiment of desire, 
furthermore, the law cannot help but become the embodiment of vari-
ous biases—class, gender, national, racial and so on. Law (or power or 
adjudication) is hardly a transparent “imperative act” similar to “linguis-
tic activities;” it is, rather, an essentially linguistic activity practiced by a 
warring group of individuals with varying amounts of power, an activ-
ity that, in turn, narrates a myriad of desires and biases. As such, law is 
never, as Levinson argues, a freezing of time through the “hardness of 
written words” (156) nor, as West posits, a transcendent act of semi-
divine decision-making. Law is, rather, a language that embodies state 
power, a language constantly being spoken, written, interpreted and 
shared by all who are contained in and by it. Adjudication, in a word, is 
not “different” from interpretation but is in fact merely one of the lat-
ter’s many forms, one of many state exercises that we call discourse.
The crucial point here is that the practice of law by lawyers and judges, 
of course, has a different effect on individuals in the community than 
the writing or reading of a novel by literary interpreters; magistrates ob-
viously have more impact on people’s lived lives than poets or literary 
critics or theorists. But as a discourse that narrates a series of categories 
in social and political life, as a performative process, law is never an au-
tonomous, self-contained, seamless, hermetically sealed body of writing 
resistant to continual refi nements through continual interventionist in-
terpretation. Law as power as representation is always, rather, a site of 
confl ictual adjudication, a site whose “imperative acts” are always open 
to question, resistance and interpretive refusal. And it is this redoing 
or re-writing that concerns the representations of law in this issue of 
ARIEL.
In many senses Christopher Columbus’s quasi-legal theatrics consti-
tute the seeds of what Pierre Bourdieu describes as the “symbolic vi-
olence” of law. For Bourdieu, the term describes the structured ways 
different social groups differentiate between themselves and others, be-
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tween desirable and undesirable, between permitted and transgressive, 
and how these divisions (and, more generally, how any symbolic rep-
resentations (languages, conceptualizations, portrayals) are “imposed 
on recipients who have little choice about whether to accept or reject 
them” (Terdiman 812). In a nutshell, symbolic violence is, according to 
Richard Jenkins, “the imposition of systems of symbolism and meaning 
(culture) upon groups or classes in such a way that they are experienced 
as legitimate” (104). 
As a symbolic act, the earliest proclamations, the earliest rituals of 
possession set into place a symbolic order which will, in time, be in-
stalled inexorably as the general social order. Indigenous symbolic sys-
tems (especially law) are not so much erased as so radically realigned 
and repositioned as to be virtually invisible. Columbus’ early actions 
constitute a grim mummery indeed, a mime of order which would vio-
lently replace existing systems as the effective mode of governance, the 
dominant mode of socially symbolic meaning making. In this sense the 
imposition of European law creates a “truth” imbricated by and founded 
upon European paradigms of discursive knowledge. But a “truth” radi-
cally undermined by its own ambivalence. It is this ambivalence, these 
inner contradictions of law, literature and representation, that form the 
crux of the challenging essays in this issue of ARIEL—essays that the 
editors have been honoured to read, interpret and debate. 
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